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Abstract
Liberals and conservatives have waged conflict over development strategies since the founding of the United
States of America. Observers of the 2016 Presidential Election may have noticed an escalation of a
preexisting trend of destructive engagement between Democrats and Republicans. The researcher pursued
primary and secondary research in an attempt to understand how conflict within and between development
paradigms in the United States can be transcended. The central research question was regarding how this
conflict affects efforts towards peacebuilding at the grassroots from the perspective of a liberal. The
2

literature review provides a brief histories of US American Political Economy and Political Economy as an
academic discipline with a focus on Friedrich Hayek and John Maynard Keynes. The secondary research
was done in conjunction with an online survey of seventy-eight individuals, collecting demographic
information as well as participants’ views on political conflict in economic policy. A discussion emerges,
blending the findings of the two inquiries into several main trends preventing transcendence of conflict
within US American development paradigms. The willingness to make leaps of faith for a Political
Economic ideology and disempowered moderate, in relation to liberals and conservative voices, were noted
within both primary and secondary research. Future research is suggested in the role of faith in ideology and
a disempowered moderate in prevention of peacebuilding.

Introduction
The deepest curiosity and broadest question of this research is how does a community create and
maintain inclusive institutions. This curiosity forced me to question if modern economics, as a subinstitution cut out of political economy, can continue to survive as an objective, mathematical science
considering how values- and interests-driven its roots are. I argue that economics, as a positive science,
cannot engage the hearts and souls of communities due to how it is structured as an institution. Its insistence
on providing technical solutions “turns off” people and, in some ways, encourages them revere it as a Truth.
The movement from one of many truths to this elevated status allows it to inform how communities should
be run, rather than helping elements run their communities.
This research is an attempt to understand how economics can revert back to its roots through better
engagement between liberals and conservatives. If liberals and conservatives can rediscover common
ground, they may not need to opt-out of development discussions through crafting a positive science. If
Political Economy becomes a platform for unearthing the values and interests that undergird the desired
development of conflict parties, the discipline may be more useful as a normative pursuit that strikes a
balance between art and science.
This exploration is critical in nature and I will be valuing humility, honesty and harmony. These
values manifest in the way the intellectual history of Political Economy and liberal narratives of
conservative political movements within the US American context are combined with a survey of citizens.
The purpose of merging these viewpoints is to gain insights into how potential for dialogue towards positive
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peace is diminished not only by the inertia of ideology, but the way in which our political economic systems
encourage discourse between liberals and conservatives.
To enjoy the benefits of a more inclusive, resilient dialogue between liberals and conservatives within
US American Political Economy, the nation must begin to value the complexity of practice over simplified,
neat theory. The subinstitution of economics must leave the comfortable realm of technical assistance and
join forces with other subfields within political economy to support efforts to increase the United States’
adaptive capacity. This research keeps several questions at the heart of what it aims to unearth:
•

Instead of producing an anti-thesis to the neoliberal order, how can liberals promote a more inclusive
economics in which conflict is a force for ideological innovation?

•

How can Political Economy, in this reimagined state, maintain a deepened, integrative pursuit of
knowledge?

•

How can this institution facilitate constructive, creative co-existence of clashing truths?

Research Background
This capstone will explore how the ideological context of modern US American Political Economy
has evolved by engaging both its intellectual origins and how individuals speak about it today. Throughout
history, dominant political economic brands have hesitated to wage conflict constructively against
alternatives. Classical economics pushed back against Keynesian economics in the early 20th century just as
the latter resisted the rise of neoclassical economics in the late 20th century. Today, another shift is
occurring, making this research timely. Economists like Kate Raworth argue the focus on economic results
(i.e., profit through efficiency gains) instead of embedded processes (i.e., how should resources be allocated
to promote context-specific, sustainable development), has both advocated for unsustainable practices while
preventing the emergence of social justice (Raworth, 2017). More moderate economists like Joseph Stiglitz,
Daron Acemoglu and Paul Krugman have made a career out of pointing out deep flaws within neoclassical
theory.
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Even with these examples of deeper engagement with the assumptions of classical and neoclassical
theory, without liberals being aware of how neoclassical economists and conservatives view the current
period could result in the perpetuation of conflict instead of a better academic discipline and practice. As
liberals see it, New Deal policies in the early 1900s, and the ensuing rise of labor unions, resulted in the
corporate interests feeling under siege. This prompted the mobilization of the political resources within the
business community. They began to develop their thinking and reach out to libertarian and social
conservatives political identity groups. This political bloc built shared economic beliefs upon common
ground for several decades, resulting in the current political force that is the reason for the gridlock in
Congress and, more generally, poor state and federal policy. Some liberals challenge their comrades’
narrative of conservatives today. Damien Cahill and Martijn Konings (2017) and others claim liberalism is
more resilient than it is perceived to be both politically and economically. Its influence in the US American
Constitution and the New Deal cemented it as the anchor around which political discourse roams. Economic
liberalism illustrates its resilience shortly after each financial crash through “light touch”, as opposed to deep
and broad, regulation. Cahill and Konings (2017) posit that progressive academics such as Karl Polanyi and
Naomi Klein are the misdiagnosing, and thereby reacting improperly, to the current conservative movement
and how neoliberalism emerged (Cahill and Konings, 2017)
This research attempts to engage with the past and present of economic liberalism to gain insights
into how it can facilitate a more peaceful future. As economics must engage in values clarification in order
to co-construct alternative economic institutions that can promote coexistence between ideologies. Without
these new institutions, destructive ideological conflict could continue to push divergent economists out of
the field. I am wondering how economics, as an institution of political economy, could be re-made to be
more life-giving to allow alternative ideologies to coexist with dominant ones.

Research Questions
Central Questions
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•

How does the conflict between US American liberals and conservatives, as seen from the liberal
viewpoint, impact the art form of peacebuilding at the grassroots level?

Secondary Questions
The following questions are intended to explore US American liberal narratives of the US American
conservative community:
1) According to liberals, what defines the conservative community and values and interests it advances?
2) What does Liberalism mean today and what conditions legitimize and maintain the assumptions and
expectations of the liberal community?
3) What is a functional definition neoliberalism, the dominant ideology in US American Political
Economy? How does it push back against a more inclusive political economy?

Definitions of Key Terms
Community – a collection of elements: subpersonalities merge into the individual, people are “nested”
alongside each other within groups, groups are “nested” within larger societies, societies within
nations, nations within the international community and, finally, into a single global entity alongside
other subdivisions of life.
Development – nurturing the genuine vibrancy and deeper sense of resilience within and among elements.
This requires a constant state of (re)contextualization of values and (re)evaluation of interests in
order to ensure that a community’s political economy is both sustainable and authentic.
Political Economy – the practical art and theoretical science of maintaining a community through the
allocation of its resources to practice its values through how it pursues its interests.
Economics – the science of allocating resources efficiently to effectively optimize a community’s way of
meeting its elements’ needs and, if possible, desires.
Faith – a demonstrated capacity by which elements are willing to make leaps over inconvenient truths in
order to preserve their narratives and models of how the world works. These truths are ones that
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other elements are willing to maintain and have the potential to instigate the (re)contextualization of
values and (re)evaluation of interests required for development to occur.
Sin – The Latin roots of this word mean “to miss the mark”; a way of being (thinking, feeling or acting) that
is maligned with the context in which the element lives.
Liberal – an individual that supports the tenants of Liberalism; a general belief in that the values of freedom,
equality and pursuit of knowledge will improve society.
Conservative – an individual that critiques the tenants of Liberalism due to the way it can undermine
tradition and order.

Literature Review
Edward Bernays, father of public relations, wrote that “we are governed, our minds are molded, our
tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of… It is they who pull the wires
which control the public mind” (Bernays, 1928). Therefore, even when neoliberal political economy proves
to not be capable of providing the basic human needs for the majority of the United States, it retains its
influence over the US American community. This literature review engages with the normative roots of the
sub-institution of economics and how it became the positive science it is marketed as today. This is an
attempt to understand how the US American collective conscious is molded by the “men we have never
heard of”.
Economics, as it is broadly understood today, began in Ancient Greece. Xenophon put oikos
(meaning “household”) and nomos (“rules” or “norms”) together to form this field of study. Though it was
initially focused on the art management of the household, he would later expand to comment on the affairs
of his city-state, Athens (Raworth, 2017). Later, Aristotle would distinguish between economics, as
Xenophon defined it, and chremastistics, or the art of acquiring wealth. This focus on art began to erode
when economics reemerged during the Enlightenment period in Europe.
The Physiocrats were a group of French thinkers that brought economics back into the minds of
scholars. Taking an empirical and philosophical approach, they promoted land and labor as the ultimate
7

sources of wealth. Labor and commerce should be free to exist within the bounds of economic theory and
moral law. Laws of society were supposed to be as close as possible to the sense of justice derived from
nature, not to ensure the success of particular economic sectors. Mercantilism and industrialism, which
emphasized foreign trade and manufacturing and put gold coin and bullion at the center of the economy,
required institutions that hampered Physiocrats’ vision of an agrarian society (Britannica, 2017).
English and Scottish thinkers responded to the ideas posed by the Physiocrats, again relying upon
empirical and philosophical arguments. James Steuart, a Scottish lawyer, introduced the concept of political
economy, blending the fields of political science and economics in the pursuit and maintenance of
relationships and resource allocations such that society could meet its needs (Steuart, 1767). Adam Smith
would not stray far, writing that political economy was a science intent on ensuring citizens’ had “plentiful
revenue” and the state had “revenue sufficient for the public services”. The contribution of Smith was
movement from the agriculture to industry through his analogy of the pin factory (Smith, 1776). Though
John Stuart Mill’s works are often seen as social and moral in nature, just like Smith, he articulated a view
of political economy. Mill argued the field to be a science that observes “laws” of combined processes for
the “production of wealth” (Mill, 1884). Though David Ricardo relied upon Smith for his understanding of
political economy, his work on taxation and trade are still referenced today (Library of Economics and
Liberty, 2008). Thomas Malthus, most known for his view that economic incentives impacted birth rates
(Landsburg, 2008).
Though David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill are referenced today, it was Adam Smith who would
become the “father” of economics. Smith’s two most recognizable works, A Theory of Moral Sentiments and
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, work together to craft a definition of wellbeing and mold a society around it. Smith states that “...the chief part of human happiness arises from the
consciousness of being beloved” (Smith, 2006). However, this is the worthiness of being loved and not
simply being loved alone: one must deserve the love they get (Smith, 2006). This is from the individual
being so content with their being that and surroundings that they are “at rest in the sense of lacking
significant discord; it is peaceful, at a deep level. Second, happiness is more like coming to a stop than like a
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process of moving toward a goal” (Griswold, 1999). He also states that the pursuit of self-interest must
follow the “established decorums and ceremonials of society” (Smith, 2006). In Wealth of Nations, which is
considered the original economics text, he argues a conflicting point. The “invisible hand” of the market was
the supreme way of increasing and maintaining a nation’s wealth and this was manifest at the firm level by
allowing them to act in accordance with their “self-enlightened interest” (Campbell and Skinner, 1982).
Though the physiocrats may have given birth to the engagement with economics, Smith and his peers
would form the foundation of what would become known as classical economics. These individuals did not
rely on empiricism as economists due today due to the lack of data and statistical tools. Instead, they were
moral philosophers (Smith), political theorists (Mill) or people with the time to invest in reflecting upon the
state of their nation. This strain of theory still has a strong hold on how economics is seen today, but its
command of Western mainstream political economies only lasted until the Great Depression.
I argue that the failure of classical economics was its preservative nature. Instead of continuously
seeking to adequately model the context so states could adapt, they made a Truth upon which to defend their
assumptions. Rapid urbanization combined with mechanized farming had radically changed the context and
how the masses interacted within and with it. The rise of socialism in Europe and, later, in the United States,
was already challenging Western mainstream political economies before the financial crash of 1929. Their
suggestions of letting the market correct itself after such a catastrophic economic event was not politically
viable. Their inability to envision the potential of this financial crash discredited their economic model,
allowing space for an alternative political economic model to become mainstream. Since classical
economics was favored by political conservatives, their political capital dropped, leaving a vacuum for more
liberal groups to enter.
John Maynard Keynes, a financial investor and economic advisor for England, made strong
statements against classical economics. He believed that classical economics “represents the way in which
we should like our Economy to behave. But to assume that it actually does so is to assume our difficulties
away.” He diverged from other classical economics by arguing that a truly free market created the brutish
conditions within which fascism and communism could emerge (Keynes, 1961). Keynes saw classical
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economists akin to those who followed the belief that “all the evils of this actual world are logically
necessary for the greater good of the best of all possible worlds” (Antognazza, 2009). Instead of living well
during booms and suffering during a contracting economy, he advocated for a facilitated homeostasis in the
economy. Keynes advanced what would become known as “countercyclical economic policy”; intervention
during downturns and saving during booms (Wapshot, 2011). When the Great Depression hit, desperation
may have encouraged people to seek an intervention and states began to supply it. Regardless, it crafted a
new mainstream, giving liberals the high ground.
Keynes’ contributions to economic theory provided an economic framework within which the
socialist-leaning working class could obtain their political economic goals. The Democratic coalition under
Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to pass the New Deal programs through Congress as Keynes’ arguments
won over moderate Republicans. Laws not only protected workers, but crafted social programs to provide
economic help to millions of US Americans (Phillips-Fein, 2009). This would only continue for veterans of
World War II in the form of the GI Bill and under the leadership of a moderate Republican. President
Eisenhower who believed that attempts to “abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate
labor laws and farm programs” was politically impossible even if “[t]here is a tiny splinter group, of course,
that believes you can do these things… Their number is negligible and they are stupid.” (Hacker and
Pierson, 2010, 189)
However, Keynes never provided the political manifesto required to deepen his economic ideology
in the minds of his followers. His empirical, softer form of capitalism may have unseated Adam Smith, but
Keynes still deeply advocated for free markets and entrepreneurship (Burgin, 2012). This allowed
classically-inspired economists to continue their work. Just as the context provided Keynes with the
opportunity to rise to stardom, the stability and growth experienced by the dominant Western Political
Economies (i.e., United States, England, France, Germany, etc) in the decades following World War II
would create a space for neoclassical economics to come out of the shadows. This was in part due to
conservative-leading political groups who were able to inject these revitalized cases for the free market into
Western politics (Phillips-Fein, 2009).
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Milton Freidman, supported by the work of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, would provide
the framework within which corporate interests could reassume the influence they had pre-Keynes. Mises
believed a centralized, or “planned”, economy could not be as innovative or efficient at allocation and
distribution of resources because governments could not respond to consumers’ demands as well freelyacting entrepreneurs (Von Mises, 1944). Hayek, a student of Mises, came to prominence in England as an
opposing voice to Keynes with Road to Serfdom while at the London School of Economics. Freidman, on
the other hand, became the dominant political economist in the United States with Capitalism and Freedom.
Freidman and Hayek believed that the purpose of capitalism was to promote freedom and keep
totalitarianism and communism at bay (Burgin, 2012). Freidman and Hayek’s desire to address
totalitarianism and communism made them politically viable in the post-war period without the economic
intervention of Keynesian policy attracted corporate interests. Their positions of influence in the US and
England also built the space within which Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher could work together to
promote what would become known as neoliberalism on a global scale.
After the turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, US American politics saw a merging of social
conservatives’ desire for order, religious conservatives’ desire for tradition and corporate interests.
Corporations began to take an active role in politics, providing incentives for management hopefuls to go to
business school instead of earning that title by working their way up as it had traditionally been, giving
reading materials to individuals. An example of this is Ronald Reagan, who received his political economy
education as a spokesperson for GE (Reagan, 1964). As this spread globally, it also became grounded in
domestic politics. Even moderate Democrats like President Clinton made statements like “end welfare as we
know it” and “era of big government is over”. During a town hall event, a college student asked House
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi about millennials’ increased open-mindedness to socialism in relation to baby
boomers to which she replied “we are capitalists” (Washington Post, 2016; American Presidency Project,
1996).
The facilitated research of Hayek, Mises and Freidman pushed the US American political economy
into a neoclassical, conservative era. Religious and social conservatives were mobilized and influenced by
11

the spread of ideas through technological innovation. Talk radio, “televangelists” and other forms of social
commentary emerged to push back against “big government” and its interventionist tendencies (PhillipsFein, 2009). Neoliberalism, the emergent ideology, would provide a context-specific conglomeration of
neoclassical economics implemented through Keynesian interventionism. It would mostly seek to meet the
needs of those who funded it, corporate interests, but it also allowed for the essential causes of the social and
religious conservatives to come into the mainstream (Phillips-Fein, 2009). Low taxes were not just for
corporations since they also helped small businesses and farmers and, more importantly, low taxes
symbolized “small” government letting citizens be free.
The gradual exposure of these types of inconsistencies allowed for the pendulum is in the process of
swinging back towards liberal values. The tide is surging back due to the failures of the dogmatic portrayals
of complex systems within “Econ 101”. Introductory, and even intermediate, economics courses offer little
more than the ideology of the free market, only exposing students to statements like “attempts to repeal the
laws of supply and demand usually backfire, and sometimes produce results virtually the opposite of those
intended” (Baumol and Blinder, 2012). Neoclassical economics is derived from the insights of the 1600s,
1700s and 1800s and their refinement by Hayek, Freidman and Mises. They have been developed into a
Truth instead of remaining the loosely tied set of philosophical perspectives they once were.
Regardless of their differences, Hayek and Keynes believed in the power of ideas. Hayek once said
“what to the contemporary observer appears as the battle of conflicting interests has indeed often been
decided long before in a clash of ideas confined to narrow circles.” (Hayek, 1949). Keynes stated that
“practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist” and “I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas”. Karl Marx, in some ways the nemesis of the two, also
saw ideas as an important way to change society and its institutions. He argued that there is a difference
between the “material transformation of the economic conditions of production” and the “ideological forms
in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (Tucker, 1972).
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Political Economy, both theoretically and practically, is deeply affected by ideology. Understanding
the oscillation of power between liberals and conservatives after the Great Depression requires exploring
what and whom both sides’ ideologies are for on a deeper level and not only what they suggest. Without
engagement with the conflict arising from the evolution of these ideological institutions, the hope of positive
peace through transcendence of this conflict, evaporates. Both liberals and conservatives crafted their
respective ideologies as a community of theories. Just as communities of people must engage constructively
to pursue their collective interests in alignment with their collective values, these ideologies must engage in
dialogue with divergent, competitive theories. This “conversation” is the only way to create a space in which
dominant ideologies can face the ways in which they devalue and diminish the potential of noncompliant
ones.
Even if Keynes and Smith were omniscient, the ideas they advanced could not promote
contextualized, holistic and durable policy making because they are not practiced as prescribed. Though
Adam Smith came up with the idea of the “invisible hand” (the precursor of the free market), he argued that
some goods and services should remain outside of the marketplace (Smith, 1776). Even though one of his
examples was of national defense, there is a US American military industrial complex with large private
firms (i.e., Blackwater, Lockheed Martin, etc). Though John Maynard Keynes believed in the capacity of
governments to intervene in the economy, he argued that macroeconomic monetary policy should be used to
keep investment stable, not fiscal policy to maintain consumption levels (Steil, 2013). In spite of this, US
American financial policy and banking has facilitated a culture of consumption instead of continuing the
investments of the New Deal era. As I stated earlier, Keynes argued classical economics assumed its effects
away. Similarly, neoclassical economics struggles to acknowledge and embrace complex reality through
how it expresses itself theoretically and practically.
Alternative economists’ writings provide insight into the impact of this conflict between one’s selfenlightened interest and institutions within Western society. Ann Pettifor (2006) argues that the financial
industry has “successfully manipulated, evaded and discredited Christian moral and ethical standards – in
particular the contempt of usury – that placed limits on the capital gains made by money-lenders and other
13

financial institutions” since the time of John Calvin (early to mid-1500s) (Pettifor, 2006). Janet
Poppendieck (1998) argues that the failure of charity to provide “fundamental solutions to the problems of
deepening poverty and growing inequality” is derived from the ecosystem of “joys and demands of personal
charity” which encourages “charity [to] replace entitlements and charitable endeavor [to] replace politics”.
Instead of charitable institutions advancing solutions, the leave “the way wide open to those who want more
inequality, not less” (Poppendieck, 1998). Considering not only the duration of this conflict, but the way in
which this conflict is waged in a destructive manner, broader and deeper consequences emerge.
Today, the mainstream economists sympathetic to liberal values are crafting economic ideas,
illustrating the way in which the pendulum is swinging back. Economists such as Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz, are speaking to institutions that fail due to “elite capture” and are warning against the high levels of
income inequality. Lesser-known Janet Poppendieck’s research on private charities and entitlement
programs has produced her term the “Wenceslas Syndrome”. She defines this as “The joys and demands of
personal charity” make us more focused on maintaining and supporting our efforts. She says we look over
the “fundamental solutions to the problems of deepening poverty and growing inequality”, leaving “the way
wide open to those who want more inequality, not less.” Poppendieck sees the Syndrome is a “collective
process that affects our entire society as charity replaces entitlements and charitable endeavor replaces
politics” (Poppendieck, 1998). These and other liberal thinkers are pushing ideas that have begun to
percolate through the liberal collective conscious and are challenging the thinking of the 1900s. If liberals
are not compassionately mindful in how they adopt these ideas, they may fail to acknowledge that
conservatives desire to have their needs met as well. This failure could result in the continued movement of
the pendulum instead of a more stable dynamic equilibrium.
Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is a widely discussed framework for understanding how
needs are met. Physiological or “primitive” (food, water, shelter, etc) needs define the base of this pyramid.
The second level is security which can extend from physical safety all the way to job security in times of
peace. Next is a sense of belonging since humans are considered to require social and emotional ties to
achieve a sense of equilibrium. Esteem needs is similar to what Smith stated above (“being beloved”) yet it
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also includes self-love. Last is self-actualization which is could be simply defined as the pursuit of one’s
potential (Taormina and Gao, 2013). Achievement of one’s potential is synonymous with what Smith refers
to as happiness as coming to a stop. The denial of these needs results in a disequilibrium within the self,
producing the perception of a “glass ceiling” halting the pursuit of one’s potential.
Violence is defined by the reduction of a community’s potential to meet their needs in culturally
relevant ways. Johan Galtung (1969) states that violence is “… the cause of the difference between the
potential and actual, between what could have been and what is.” Galtung (1969) goes further to define
violence as “that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes
the decrease of this distance” and “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life,
lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” (Galtung 1990). SIT
Professor Tatsushi Arai took this definition and condensed it, stating that violence is “Any form of social
influence harming the human body, mind, and/or spirit, directly or indirectly, intentionally or
unintentionally” (Arai, 2016).
I use a definition of conflict as a community perceiving another as impeding their development.
LeBaron and Pillay (2006) defines conflict as a perceived incompatibility between multiple parties that
constrains their ways of feeling, thinking and being. What makes conflict difficult to transcend is when these
parties are interdependent yet derive different meaning and experiences from their shared identity (M.
LeBaron and V. Pillay, 2006). Therefore, even if they are both US American, differences in quality of life
and other socioeconomic divides, how those divides came to be and what they say about the parties can
make them turn inward. Though they require the same resources for similar needs and wants, this focus
reinforces divides, making cultural markers even more important for maintaining status within a party’s ingroup and distinguishing themselves from the “other”.
These divides become more complex when communities are “nested” within and beside one another.
Instead of single tensions between groups to exist, this framework envisions conflicts between and within
various communities and their elements and across a variety of issues in an interdependent, web-like manner
(Dugan, 1996). If resources are sufficiently accessible to all conflict parties, escalation of conflict may not
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occur since the involved groups can meet their needs. However, when institutions promote allocation of
resources in a way that aligns with values and interests within one community while ignoring the needs of
others, conflict may arise even if resources are sufficient to meet the needs of the meta-community. In order
for institutions to promote the virtuous cycles that maintain peace and prosperity, they must support the
systems that encourage constructive yet empathetic engagement between and within communities.
Institutions structures that facilitate behavior, attitudes and beliefs. They are the frameworks within
ecosystems that support and maintain intra- and inter-personal, intra- and inter-group dynamics. Geoffrey
Hodgson (2006) that sees institutions “as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure
social interactions”. Rules are “socially transmitted through customary normative injunction or immanently
normative disposition”. To summarize a rule, Hodgson (2009) states that “in circumstances X do Y”. He
explicitly states that behavior and institutions are separate since the prior happens within the decision
architecture of, and is thereby influenced by, the latter (Hodgson, 2006). Friedrich Hayek, a giant in
neoclassical economics, posits that rules have a “little changing foundation of genetically inherited,
‘instinctive’ drives” as well as from logic and social interaction (Hayek, 1973).
Rules can be made simply to provide predictability and, thereby, trust and cooperation (Sosis and
Ruffle, 2003). Hodgson (2006) states that “if the rule is scrutinized or contested, then normative issues will
emerge” (Hodgson, 2006). The erosion of a rule, especially when it is connected to others, could destabilize
a community. However, the rule may be deemed violent by the “other”, suggesting that it was created
exclusively. Furthermore, Max Weber (1978) argues that a rule can exist “without any subjective
formulation in thought of the ‘rule’”, making it also potentially violent when context shifts far enough from
the one within which the rule was created.
Though an economist would use “law” or “theory” to describe a rule, the concept is the same. The
subfield has crafted a societal position for itself to craft how we pursue and maintain wealth. Flora Michaels
(2011) writes “in these early decades of the twenty-first century, the master story is economic: economic
beliefs, values and assumptions are shaping how we think, feel and act.” (Michaels, 2011). The role of
economics in our lives makes it a dominant institution in US American social reality yet it is not responsive
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to the shifting context of the nation nor communities it attempts to shape. Instead, it has been influenced to
facilitate “proper” behavior as deemed appropriate by the US American political economic elite. The Robert
Solow, a modern influential economist, once said:
“There has always been a purist streak in economics that wants everything to follow neatly from
greed, rationality and equilibrium with not ifs, ands or buts… The theory is neat, learnable, not
terribly difficult, but technical enough to feel like ‘science.’ Moreover, it is practically guaranteed to
give laissez-faire-type advice, which happens to fit nicely with the general turn to the right that
began in the 1970s and may or may not be coming to an end” (Solow, 2008).
Hayek supports the first part of this statement, stating that “[referring to economics] the propensity to imitate
as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful sciences… may lead to outright error”
(Hayek, 1974).
Conflict transformation within the institution of Political Economy is required for the discipline to
facilitate the emergence of positive peace in communities. Without transcending the divides between art and
science, Keynes and Hayek and other diverging perspectives, Political Economy cannot serve inclusively.
Conflict Transformation is a process by which a community understands “the ebb and flow of social conflict
as life-giving opportunities” (Lederach, 2003). This means that a community is aware of how a context is
slowly yet constantly shifting and is looking to conceptualize challenges with adaptive, as opposed to
technical, solutions. This is to reduce violence and increase justice in relationships between people and
groups through continuously updating institutions so that they are grounded in reality, rather than the
expectations we bring from our chosen traumas and glories. Instead of the creative destruction of capitalistic
societies, akin to sprinting and lying winded, a slower pace of evolution could be the source of innovation.
Without the destructiveness of the current modes of innovation, predictability, and eventually trust,
could emerge. Peace manifests along a spectrum from negative to positive. Direct violence is a particular
event or occurrence in space time as a concrete manifestation of cultural and structural violence (Galtung,
1969). Negative peace is the cessation of direct violence. Positive peace is the emergence of social justice,
allowing for many or all groups within the community to achieve their own potentials (Galtung, 1990).
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Though positive peace can only emerge when structural and cultural violence recedes, this study has a deep
focus on structural violence within the institutions of economics.
An alternative vision for the institution of Political Economy must create institutions that have built
in checks against assumptions or else they could allow for violence to emerge. This means that Political
Economy must strive to facilitate adaptive work. Ronald Heifetz (1994) defines this kind of work to be when
a community updates its beliefs, attitudes and actions to meet the challenges in front of it. Leaders
conceptualizing alternative brands of political economy must naturally facilitate this inclusive, ground-up
change by reimagining political economy so that it can “frame issues so that people would comprehend the
opportunity and challenge to them” (Heifetz, 1994). This new way of practicing political economy brings it
towards its more philosophical, contextualized roots.
This research is to encourage agents in US American Political Economy towards a different
understanding of the context in which they advocate for their political economic truths. As Hayek was trying
to wage ideological conflict upon the wave of US American democratic socialism in the early and mid1900s, he appreciated the need for “secondhand dealers in ideas”. He believed that these individuals and
groups should be motivated solely by the belief in the idea itself and not personal or in-group gain at the
beginning (Hayek, 1949). Though many would assume that stridently, boldly defending liberal values is the
best way to spread the ideas of Stiglitz, Pettifor, Poppendieck and others. However, liberals may become
better advocates not through closing their ranks, but by opening their hearts and minds.
Just as liberals argue that conservatives seem unable to see particular issues with an objective eye,
they, too, must be aware of their own assumptions. Damien Cahill and Martijn Konings (2017) argue that
the way in which liberal scholars have understood neoliberalism is not as convincing as some of their
readership argues. Crafting an understanding of this ideology as the product of the efforts of the political and
economic elites to revive classical economics and, thereby, capitalism focuses on particular policy issues
instead of a holistic understanding of the rise of this ideology. Histories of the conservative movement, such
as Phillips-Fein (2009) and Burgin (2012), craft an interventionist narrative of the rise of neoliberalism.
They do not discuss the role of “American exceptionalism” or rise of the standard of living that could have
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facilitated the reduction of political engagement within the same groups that were so active before and
during the Great Depression. Konings (2015) posits that arguments derived from Karl Polyani’s work sees
money as “cold” and “devoid of human content”. Money without a connection to humanity devalues the
deep connection Max Weber (2002) made between Protestantism and capitalism in his writings. As liberals
demand for their ideas to influence mainstream US Political Economy, they must also be aware of the role
divergent thinking could play in not only improving their own thinking, but that of the nation as well.
Economics, a sub-institution of Political Economy, can contain the misdiagnosis and mistreatment of
issues by becoming more inclusive. Divergent economists’ ideas have given birth to subfields and, if
mainstream economics begins to incorporate them, they could contribute immensely to an integrated
Political Economy. These subfields have the capacity to challenge the assumptions of the mainstream,
unearthing the bias that has been supporting them. If economists are more aware of the ways in which their
perspectives are pulled by their experiences and education, maybe they can start supporting development
efforts that are inclusive of other ways of knowing about satisfying basic human needs. Political economists
should begin to think of themselves as holders of a truth, not the Truth, so they can be more humble and
sustainable contributors to US American Political Economy.

Research Methodology
This research is exploratory in the sense that I intentionally wander across and within many
disciplines with the help of scholars, practitioners and scholar-practitioners. This is a journey to find how
common ground is hidden by the stereotypes of the other we hold onto and how this could inform a theory
of change to promote transcendence of the conflict of interest. This research project is participatory in the
sense that allows for the diverse voices to contribute. I have read liberal thinkers and their progressive critics
and the conservative political economists that critique both groups. I have attended panel discussions and
talks at both liberal and conservative think tanks in Washington, DC to get a feel for their narratives in
specific policy areas and the branches of the US Government today. I intend to incorporate the views of the
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coastal elite, through being present in Washington, DC. I also hope that these views are tempered by also
owning my childhood in suburbia and rural upstate New York and the administered survey.

Goals of Inquiry
I am a person who believes that objectivity is an unreachable pursuit due to how subjective the process
of experiencing, learning and remembering are. Instead of trying to be impartial speakers, we should be
multi-partial listeners. Empathetic vibes towards those with whom we are engaged in dialogue can be
reciprocated if we construct and then maintain discourse to do so. This is the way to produce inclusive,
holistic knowledge upon which a community can constantly understand and reinvent itself.
The following is a list of aspirations I composed for the research proposal for this capstone. Though this
was a requirement, I’m glad I wrote down what motivated and shaped my desires for this research. I share it
here to be transparent in how my identities and hopes pulled my learning from the beginning of this project.
Over the last two years, I have been hoping to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Gain a better understanding of how to research and then produce knowledge;
Prepare myself to deepen and broaden my understanding of various American subcommunities
pursue their interests in alignment with their values regarding work;
Better position myself as a liberal scholar-advocate;
Develop a deeper awareness of how economic thinking has narrowed options for solving issues;
Improve my understanding of the feedback loops, stocks and flows and other system dynamics that
maintain the conflict theatre of interest;
Integrate my undergraduate and graduate work.

The Development of the Researcher’s Positionality
Though I was raised within US American working class and Haitian immigrant cultures, I have been
fortunate to have been given the time and resources to do this research. Therefore, I see myself as having
afforded a unique opportunity to prepare myself to be a peacebuilder within US American Political
Economy. I also believe this due to my multiracial, multi-religious background, adoption of a multitude of
philosophies and appreciation for various geographical regions and spaces. Due to what I was born into, I
see myself as capable of existing between, as opposed to picking, sides. However, due to my values and
interests, I have fundamental disagreements with the institutions crafted with the guidance of neoclassical
economics. Understanding, and mounting counterarguments against, these institutions was my main interest
as an undergraduate. On a personal level, this research is an attempt to check the bias of those left-leaning
counterarguments. Though I feel I have failed to deeply understand my bias and the attitudes and beliefs it
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perpetuates, just trying has taught me so much about a way of life to which I do not adhere. Simply trying to
engage conservative ideology has made me feel that meaningful, fulfilling dialogue is possible: I have
become a cautious optimist.
I began college by declaring mathematics and economics majors because all of my economics
courses were quantitative and theoretical. One semester, I learned partial derivatives in an introductory math
class and how to use partial derivatives to determine the optimum recipe for baking apple pies in my
intermediate microeconomics class. However, I always saw cooking as having a more equitable balance
between art and science. “Why would I not use preferences of my family or clientele or the recipe my
grandmother passed down?” Since undergraduates were allowed to enroll in graduate courses, I saw how the
economists from low- and middle-income countries received a similar education. I began to take courses in
theatre, Africana studies, leadership studies, cultural theory, psychology, to force me to engage the set of
values and interests thrust upon me by economics as I was taught about it. I began to believe that economics
could not be taught to create more economists. Instead, these courses that could have been potential
distractions eventually became what convinced me to work in the field of development, broadly defined.
Upon completing my undergraduate studies, I had a divergent understanding of what Political
Economy was for, who could practice and study it and it what ways. This was not only informed by the
theory with which I was exposed, but also practical experience. When I interned at a think tank in Cape
Town, South Africa, I was responsible for data management, statistical analysis and survey editing. I left
wondering why there weren’t there economics students with more contextual awareness than myself who
could do this research. I began to question the focus on quantitative analyses when conversations with my
soccer teammates produced more deeply embedded, holistic information to understand the issues
communities faced. I worked for an advocacy groups in New York State and federal politics. I saw how the
context within which organizations advanced, sustained and defended their values and interests. These
organizations’ capacities were profoundly influenced by the ecosystem of sociopolitical dynamics within
which they had to recruit talent and funding streams and wage conflict with allies and adversaries.
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It concerns me that Political Economy’s theoretical frameworks are so detached from the realities
with which real people deal. I worry that instead of ensuring the field continuously works to improve its
capacity to solve issues society faces, incentives exist to encourage the sub-institutions (i.e., economics,
political science, etc), and the scholars and practitioners within them, to shape society in ways that make
Political Economy increasingly more relevant. It is as if the institution of Political Economy is a living
organism seeking to meet its own needs within academic ecosystem. The focus seems to be on perpetuating
Political Economy, rather than making development align with communities’ values and interests.
I acknowledge that I cannot produce an “objective” portrayal of what conflict and development are.
Though I do not ascribe to the liberalism that the United States has practiced, I would be considered a
liberal. This research was started with the hope of highlighting opportunities for Political Economy to
become a more service-oriented, positive-peace-promoting field of scholarship and practice. My hope has
been for Political Economy to become a force for reducing the ways in which potential is diminished so that
alternative viewpoints can truly coexist with more traditional perspectives. The vibrancy and resilience of
one group should not mean that another is less so: I do not believe in zero-sum games. I aspire to see a
Political Economy that is a platform where hopes and dreams for development meet with those who can find
the unconventionally viable pathways for making them reality.

Conceptual Framework of Research
The goal of the theoretical and practical research is to bring critical theory into the field of Political
Economy. Critical methodologies are posit that power is ubiquitous, making analyses without it fail at
describing an environment. Critical approaches “reject and challenge binary categories that seek to polarize
and essentialize difference” so seeing research as in or out of a particular discipline—and thereby making an
implicit decision on its relevance or positionality within a research project—seems out of step with critical
theory (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). This branch is very warry of absolute truths and see “the traditional
positivist scientific process ultimately creates knowledge that is used to maintain (justify, fortify,
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reconstruct) the status quo in which minorities are oppressed through the reproduction of dominant
ideology” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011).
The purpose of a “critical political economy theory” is to bring analytical perspectives into a field
that does not go far enough to challenge the public view that the free market, when left to its own devices,
will make everyone better off. I argue that this field has always been normative and built upon Western postEnlightenment Truth. I argue has intentionally crafted itself to seem positive and mathematical to argue its
positionality as the Truth. I am merging qualitative and quantitative economic analyses of the past with
critical theory in order to describe the impact of the rise of neoliberal economics.
I define myself as an antidisciplinarian in the way that desire to simultaneously disregard and engage
with academic disciplines that organically develops out of the knowledge I seek to obtain. I let my research
pull me as much as I structured it. I did not desire to constrict the knowledge I gain by the methods others
create to articulate their perspectives and experiences: I aim to let it breathe and live. I practiced
interdisciplinarity in order to obtain the insights of various disciplines by focusing on the defining theories
and their critiques. I was transdisciplinarian in the way that I encouraged a dialogue between these
normative suggestions to facilitate constructive conflict and innovative thought. Though I happened to
engage with more fields than notable scholars in political economy, my research evaded some fields for the
sake of practicality, making me multidisciplinarian as well. I hope I made my decisions and their impacts on
this study clear by discussion my positionality throughout this paper.

Sample Selection and Data Collection and Analysis
The sample was conceptualized as a way of understanding how people speak about conflict and
development within US American domestic politics. Initially, the sample was going to be academics and
practitioners within the field of US American domestic development. Though it may have been helpful to
discuss how political conflict constrains development with community development practitioners, this
sample was eventually rejected considering the adherence to theoretical discourse within academia. Policy
facilitators, a profession that focuses on maintaining diverse coalitions for legislative and policy change, was
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another sample option. However, this group was too supportive of constructive discourse and focused on
climate policy.
I ended up deciding to do a survey instead of one-on-one interviews or focus groups. Engaging with
the two options above made me realize that I, as a researcher, valued breadth over depth. This meant that I
had to conduct a survey in order to obtain as large a number of participants as possible. Though this meant
that I could not receive and analyze explanations for answers, I felt that the addition of open-ended
questions, in combination with demographic information, could provide some information to guide how I
tied responses to the condition out of which they emerged.
This conclusion also made me realize that I deeply valued the experience of everyday people over
professionals. Though I appreciate the work that those directly or indirectly affiliated with development do, I
felt that this research project was more about the layperson and I wanted to know how they felt. Living in
Washington, DC a huge part of this decision because attending talks at the Brookings Institute, the United
States Institute of Peace or any of the other esteemed institutions in that city made me see how divided these
academics and practitioners were from the people they were supposed to be serving. This decision was an
attempt to influence research back towards the grassroots.
I posted surveys on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn in order to collect the qualitative data required
to temper the academic research with more practically grounded perspectives. I assumed that because I have
had the privilege of being able to associate with a variety of groups through opportunities I have been given,
I would have a more diverse sample from which to pull. Also, since the goal was to understand how liberals
craft their stereotypes of conservatives, having a liberal-biased sample may have been an asset, not a
liability.
This survey was both analyzed through the tools provided by SurveyMonkey and exported files
within Microsoft Excel. After this stage of analysis, the data were contextualized within theory. I also
analyzed the data with an eye towards how responses had the potential to narrow or open the set of solutions
for decision makers. This was complimented by relating responses in the open-ended questions to
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demographic data. Trends within the open-ended responses were noted and they, too, were contextualized
within political economy, peacebuilding and other academic literature.

Findings
The drawback to using social media was made clear by how my positionality affected the participant pool to
which I had access, affecting the demographic responses. The vast majority of the 78 participants were
between twenty-four and thirty-five years old (63%) and had either graduate (50%) or undergraduate (41%)
degrees. Most were from New England (32%) and the Mid-Atlantic (35%) regions of the United States.
Most participants self-identified as male (61%) as opposed to female 37%) or gender fluid (1%).
Considering how many participants were from suburban (44%) and rural (25%), it was not surprising to get
such a high number of white participants (70%), even though 24% of the participants were from urban areas.
Though many participants were Agnostic (41%) and Christian (36%), religious diversity exists in this
survey. On a scale of 0 to 100, the vast majority of participants ranked themselves below average, producing
a mean of 38, in their dedication to their religion.
Questions regarding political and socioeconomic identity were also not dissimilar by my own
preferences. Participants were mostly liberal (41%), followed by very liberal (25%), independent (24%) and
conservative (8%). Considering my interest in understanding how progressives are biased, I did not see this
as a serious issue. With regard to class, a value of 57 out of a scale of 0 to 100 emerged, illustrating that the
majority of participants saw themselves as part of the middle or upper middle classes. Their responses to
questions about political conflict were not unexpected for a liberal-leaning group and they are grouped in the
three, interconnected sections below.

Discussion
Though the sample did not stray too far from identities I claim to hold myself, it was still a humbling
experience to have my assumptions discredited by the data. The conclusions I drew from the survey
fundamentally altered how I engaged with people. I began to care more about their feelings and the language
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they used to express themselves as opposed to exclusively focusing on the content of what they were saying.
I began to become more conscious of the role of other forms of communication (i.e., body language, pitch,
etc.) during conversations with people who shared their feelings with me. Instead of launching into deep,
tough conversations, I have begun to respect the timing of a conversation and the space I am in when I have
it. Doing the follow up research to link the data to theory was a pleasure and I hope it will help both scholars
and practitioners engage within and between themselves as they strive to develop the United States.
State of Conflict
The lack of meaningful dialogue between liberals and conservatives results in a version of US
Political Economy that diminishes both of their capacities to self-express. Both liberals and conservatives
maintain the prevailing belief that the “other” will not constructively engage. This maintains how both
communities’ willingness expending resources into defining themselves in opposition to their perceived
adversary, escalating the conflict. Defining the relationship in such combative terms makes the “paranoid”
style sustainable through polarization between and within conflict parties. Liberals and conservatives’
“paranoia” begins to emerge in more issues and they both seek to gain additional subgroups or deepen their
inner support.
US American Political Economy, as an institution, seems to jerk itself through spacetime. One
explanation is that US American subcommunities lack the will or capacity to engage in dialogue to unearth
unconventionally viable solutions. The “paranoid style” posits that political minorities understand their
issues of concern to be symptoms of fiendish, evil groups enacting destruction upon their way of life
(Hofstadter, 1964). This has a deep effect upon how they understand, model and respond to the world
around them. The “paranoid style” resonated with how participants described the lack of dialogue in US
American politics. “Paranoia”, as described by Hofstadter (1964) also seemed to describe how the adoption
of extreme, unreasonable positions put US Americans in moral jeopardy. Radical positions, regardless if
they are on the right or left, may prevent the maintenance of values and interests up to the standards of their
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predecessors. When the “other” is the one pointing out the discontinuity, grabbing on tighter to the ideology
may be easier than admitting failure to both the “other” and one’s predecessors.
I argue that the lack of coherence emerges out of this inner conflict that conflict with the “other”
emerges. For example, freedom in its purest form (i.e., “I can do whatever I want”) is limited if we also
believe in equality. These two liberal values, though attractive in theory, craft a precarious situation when
put into practice. Those who feel slighted by the “System” or “Man” push back in an attempt to re-achieve
that harmony between their values and interests. However, the inability to maintain one’s values in
alignment with their interests results in a disjointed existence. The lack of integration keeps traumatic events
and contexts present in the minds of conflict parties. The adherence to rigid, radical positions reduces the
individual and collective capacities to listen to the inner voice that is the compass.
In US American Political Economy, neither political party loses or wins substantial, durable steps
towards their vision of their nation while also addressing the root of issues. Critiques emerging from
different prioritizations of values and interests facilitate fracturing within the liberal and conservative
communities. When a political party is in power, this prevents a united front against the perceived adversary
who desires to regain their lost influence. This results in the belief that the adversary has infiltrated the party
and only total victory will eradicate a villain of such strength (Hofstadter, 1964). In response, other groups
within the same party further radicalize themselves. During this fracturing, the party that was out of power
sees the need to come together to take advantage of the squabbling party. They seek common ground and
work to mobilize their followers as the party in power ceases to be a viable political entity for the next
election. The next election, the party in power is voted out and the cycle begins anew, this time with a new
party in charge. When this is understood in relation to nested theory, these cycles are nested within each
other. This means that over time, the spiritual toll of these cycles begin to last beyond each renewal,
complicating and layering their “paranoia” across policy domains and election cycles. This drain of energy
and focus could prove costly, particularly when engaging other nations with longer time horizons.
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The cyclical nature of this conflict has grinded the United States into gridlock. The current state of
ideological conflict encouraging of the positions we see today within the liberal and conservative
communities. So called “one issue voters”, “protest votes” and other forms of over-commitment push people
from a solving, collaborative mindset to a more competitive one. The issue, however, is not that competitors
exist, but that they are so loud in discourse in relation to collaborators. It is this imbalance that makes the
size of the set of unconventionally viable solutions narrow, reducing the flexibility by which conflicts can be
transformed towards transcendence.
However, United States has yet to reach a deep enough sense of motionlessness that jump starts the
desire to intentionally de-escalate ideological conflict. This allows political and economic conflicts to
escalate without any clear path beyond the system dynamics which maintain the constraint growth and
repeal of regulation. When rigid ideologies form and are believed in by liberals and conservatives, weakened
moderates and, due to campaign finance laws, empowered special interests become the only network
brokers. This gives special interests, as nodes of the sociopolitical network that connects US American
institutions, an increased capacity to prune and nurture regulation according to their interests until their bias
is exposed. It seems as the impact of the unthinkable happening is often large enough to shake worldviews,
but not to encourage the faithful to adapt their attitudes in relation to larger forces. I would like to see future
research about civic infrastructure and civil society to address how ideological faith encourages the
perception of unthinkable realities, regardless of the context.

The role of the moderate in dialogue
Though this spacetime is not conducive to being a moderate, it was still interesting to see how so
many individuals self-identified as one of the dominant ideologies (conservative or liberal) or to opt out by
selecting independent. Very few people distinguished themselves further and only one participant selfidentified as a moderate. When it came to the US American economy, moderates were described directly as
“confused” or “unsure” by several respondents.

28

Other participants in this survey stated the lack of a middle, going as far as believing that moderates
did not exist in this particular space of political discourse or the reasonable minds had vacated the middle.
This perception of the moderate as either nonexistent or not capable of being a constructive political actor
could be a symptom of the context. Like other times in US American history, partisanship is high and
tensions between parties seems to only get more dramatic with each news cycle. However, there are steps
scholar-practitioners recommend for those who can and would step into what has become a political “No
Man’s Land” to these participants.
One respondent posited that moderates are defined by their risk aversion. This may have been meant
politically, in the words of another participant, a moderate “spends too much on war but not enough to end
the war. Meanwhile, civilian pop is left in hot water without strong social safety nets”. It could also mean
that they are not willing to take a stand on an issue by committing to a policy or set of values, making them
seem as someone who cannot lead because they have not chosen a side. However, moderates may be exactly
the individuals capable of assuming adaptive leadership. Other participants stated moderates are also defined
by their “Willingness to experience a hardship or imposition in order to better the group” and valuing of
“parts of both economic ideologies”, they could be able to ask questions like “does this war help define us as
a community?” or “are these resources better spent elsewhere?”.
Bernard Meyer (2004) puts forward a perspective that provides a more nuanced perspective on what
it means to facilitate constructive engagement. He posits that conflict resolution practitioners should focus
less about being in the middle and more about being a conflict expert with an awareness of the structure and
culture of the groups involved and the context in which they are engaged. This opens who a neutral can be
someone more akin to a referee who has the trust of both sides. The neutral may own their perspective and
how it molds their opinions, but they must be aware of how their positionality can be interpreted by others.
Therefore, what may be preventing the existence of the moderate is a context in which liberals and
conservatives believe that the middle doesn’t exist. It is not that people empathetic to both sides are not
around, but that there is a durable perception that no one can possibly hold liberal and conservative values.
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There may be people who would like to de-escalate a heated political discussion during a family discussion,
but they don’t have people at the table that are willing to identify them as neutral and a bridge.
Analysis of the word clouds showed some controversial topics. “Government” and values and
interests associated with liberal or progressive economics (“social”, “community” and “safety net”) were
both used 32 times in responses. They were used in questions regarding the definitions of both liberals and
conservatives, illustrating how the role of government in the economy is a key point in any discourse
between and among the two political orientations. This was particularly evident by the frequency of “taxes”
and “low taxes”, which appeared twelve times and it was a defining feature of the economic conservative.
Questions regarding the definition of a liberal and a conservative both used “belief” or “believe”, but
it was nonexistent in the description of a moderate. The quantitative analysis and qualitative investigation of
this phenomenon were not sophisticated enough to give adequate support for a particular explanation. It
could be that the positionality of US American ideological conflict could be such that moderates are getting
drowned out. Another possibility is that moderates do not have the will or capability to speak up.
The qualitative data and research show that there are rigid perceptions which have formed about
aspects of an issue about which conflict parties are discussion. Therefore, it was not surprising when
participants seemed pessimistic regarding constructive engagement during dialogue. One respondent
identified as very liberal illustrated what seemed to be the mainstream view. The participant said that they
“would [reach across the aisle] because some compromise is necessary, however, the other side's values are
antithetical to mine, they are misinformed, and stalwartly against compromise themselves. There is no
foundation for real dialogue, substantive debate, or fair negotiations.”
Meyer (2004) argues that there are several needs individuals or groups have when they enter a
discussion: voice, procedural justice, vindication, validation and safety. These interwoven needs provide the
sustenance for people to engage, even if it is destructively. A facilitator or mediator needs to find ways to
make conflict parties feel like their needs are met to get them to the table (Meyer, 2004). Keeping the groups
at the table is another challenge. A participant stated that engaging with the other was “exhausting” and
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another mentioned how difficult conservations were without “respect and acceptance”. Meyer (2009) argues
that we must “stay with conflict” even if avoidance is more comfortable. This requires a commitment to
keeping pathways of conversation open by crafting agreements and systems that can sustain the conflict
parties over time. Neutrals must be more aware of the ways they can support the communities to which they
belong to remain in discourse with the “other” (Meyer, 2009). Meanwhile, in order to maintain the
moderate, communities must support those who are willing and able to assume the role of the compassionate
mindful neutral. This feedback loop must be nurtured for “respect and acceptance” to emerge.
People feel the need to be heard, preferably by authorities, with the hope of being on equal footing
with their adversary so the opponent impeding their pursuit of justice can be seen as the evil doer. Though
there was no mention of an influential neutral, participants often stated their belief in the wrongness of the
other. One participant summed it up well, saying “When I talk to conservatives, I am shocked at their refusal
to accept facts provided by science and education, if the facts do not agree with their reality.” Dialogue
participants also want to feel like their struggle is acknowledged, allowing them to impact their own
situation and influence the broader issues that impact them and their group. An individual that self-identified
as very liberal and stated they “are not a very big fan of the Democratic party” believes that “too busy trying
to pull the Democratic party to the left to worry about what the bad-faith conservative elites are lying to their
base about”. Since this participant did not see the Democratic party as a neutral platform, they were “busy”
attempting to pull it towards a space where their views would be seen and heard. Without this movement,
the participant could not adequately influence their surroundings and the nation more broadly.
Last, but not least, they want to feel safe, or else they will not be inclined to engage genuinely and
constructively (Meyer, 2004). Though “fear” only appeared twice in the questions about reaching across the
aisle, it resonated deeply with comments other participants made. Commentary on wasting time, validating
the others incorrect perspective or a lack of reciprocity could be tied to fear of seeming naïve to other
liberals. More research on the role of fear in impeding dialogue in this context would be useful.
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The very liberal participant’s words are also a blunt illustration the way in which other participants
thought engaging conservatives was a waste of time. The word “consensus” appeared eight times in the two
questions about reaching across the aisle yet the overwhelming belief of participants was that this could not
happen. I argue this is where the perception about moderates and lack of constructive dialogue come
together. Participants did not see a viable neutral entity they could engage to share how their values manifest
in the fears and hopes they have for their country.
The moderate may require a new leadership paradigm. One individual stated that they didn’t reach
“across the aisle” because they were not in a position of power. Ronald Heifetz (1994) empowers us by
defining leadership as an activity, not a positionality. Therefore, we lead by shifting our attitudes towards
those which promote our respective groups’ capacity to adapt to a new reality as opposed to entrenching in
avoidance of it. This means that institutions for a community of any size, support the participation of
individuals, instead of increasing the power distance between elected officials and those that elected them.
Instead of giving into the urge to follow elected officials that sow discord between groups, citizens may
begin to see those candidates as incapable of leading. Leadership as an activity empowers the grassroots to
constructively engage moderates and, eventually, those on the other side of the aisle.
The conflict resolution field offers perspectives that individuals that are deserving of the trust of
conflict parties can use to maintain that trust and promote constructive engagement. Arai (2009) urges us to
be creative in how we solve (not win) incompatibility. This means conflict parties must open the perceived
size of the solution set through existing at the interface of unconventionality and viability, what Tatsushi
Arai (2009) defines as creativity. This requires individuals with the capacity or willingness to hold multiple
identities in a conflict to facilitate an atmosphere within which existing reality is re-seen by scholars and
practitioners.

Faith as a non-religious asset
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The faith in empiricism to ground broader assumptions about humanity and the world is beginning to
facilitate conflict between liberals and conservatives. This is most clear in terms of climate change, but
beliefs and science are perceived to contradict each other in other policy domains as well. When economists
are cavalier in their efforts to craft rigorous studies and draw good conclusions from the data, policymakers
that see positivism as a way to reduce bias, and therefore rely upon economists, can be dangerous. Failing to
engage with the bias inherent to the way in which the study is catered to an audience (i.e., funding source,
politician, political bloc, etc) results in violent policy outcomes. This requires constant re-regulation as
opposed to a more flexible, adaptive structure that improves in its capacity to advise in the face of
complexity.
The United States, under the liberal-leaning, post-World War II regime, grew into what some social
scientists refer to as a WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) nation. Henrich,
Heine and Norenzayan (2010) claims that US Americans pursued and produced human psychological and
behavioral studies upon which social scientist relied for their conclusions. However, due to the sample bias
caused by the WEIRD-ness of the participants, this resulted in an empirical understanding of the how
societies work that is based upon a very narrow slice of humanity (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010).
This, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) claims, has resulted in the behavioral sciences being
insufficiently careful regarding the assumptions they make. Therefore, when policymakers consult academia
and thinkers about how to craft incentives, they model upon the outliers instead of the mainstream.
The fundamental truths of economics are at stake due to the way in which academics have
constructed their field. Economists have built a model that of a human as a “consumer who knows what he
or she wants and makes the most of the available opportunities”. This individual finds their satisfaction from
consuming a particular set of goods and services and it is measured in “utility”. “[T]he assumption that
consumers maximize utility helps [economists] think clearly about consumer choice” however they “don’t
expect to measure [it] in practice” (Krugman and Wells, 2009). Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard
Debreu investigated this more deeply, but ended up producing normative models within the cultural context
they lived and were studying. Those who pulled from this particular strain of utility maximization theory
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considered decisions that violated the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference or the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preferences were deemed irrational (Fehr and Glimcher, 2009).
The contributions of subfields could facilitate the emergence of middle ground between the “camps”
within economics. However, due to the lack of inclusion within this discipline, the camps become
increasingly divergent. The subfield of neuroeconomics “seeks to ground microeconomic theory in details
about how the brain works” (Camerer, 2007). Furthermore, in line with Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan
(2010), utility could be based upon a WEIRD sample, making cross-cultural development strategies likely to
facilitate development for only a small slice of the community of interest.
The failure of those who claim to draw from Keynesian economics to deliver on their promises of
economic stability provides ammunition for the conservatives who claim that liberals are “ruining America”.
Liberals that take positions through valuing empirical studies, as opposed to taking stands on principles, can
be seen as amoral. It the perceived lack of a code of ethics makes it hard for liberals to argue for their
policies. Instead, they may discuss how conservatives are wrong to not rely upon science to make their
decisions. Both groups are arguing about their positions, rather than sharing their underlying values and
interests, resulting in a battle of beliefs instead of a solving mindset.
Increases in the sophistication of empirical methodologies and technologies has seemed to shift faith
from religious forms to scientific varieties instead of reducing the human desire to craft a Truth to follow.
This results in the maintenance of narratives as opposed to constantly recontextualizing values and
reevaluating interests in alignment with shifts in context. Therefore, what distinguishes WEIRD societies is
not their wealth, egalitarianism, levels of literacy or economic capacity, but their disregard for sustainability
and the ensuing violence to future generations and other societies. By not respecting the power of time and
space, WEIRD societies are not maintaining in alignment with what came before them and what exists
around them. It is this perceived lack of respect that could be what makes conservatives so frustrated.

The role of faith in maintenance of ideological resilience
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A dominant thread within the open-ended questions, regarding difficulties for the participant and the
group they perceive to be the other, was about faith. Though low levels of commitment to a religion were
reported, I do not mean faith in a religious sense. I mean to say that participants seemed to believe that the
“other” was incapable of engaging constructively because of their commitment to their creed or ideology.
Participants that defined themselves as liberal or very liberal stated that “myopic” conservatives don’t
“deserve that validation”. Other self-identifying liberals defined liberals as “open minded” and stated that
the “Democratic party seems pretty moderate economically”. Participants that self-identified as liberal
displayed faith in their in-group to the degree that it affected how they understood their political
compliment.
The issue of ideological faith in political economy is not only one of the present context, but one that
has plagued the discipline throughout time. Though contemporary economists, and those they influence,
believe the field of economics to be value-less, its roots say otherwise. Economists, such as Milton
Freidman, argued that as the field aged, it became a “‘positive’ science focused on describing what is” and a
“value free zone” (Raworth, 2017). George Mankiw, an author of many modern economics textbooks,
defines the field as “the study of how society manages its scarce resources” (Mankiw, 2012). This led
Presidents like John F. Kennedy to claim that economic decision making had ceased being “some grand
warfare of rival ideologies” that “sweep the country with passion”; economic policy had become the
“practical management of a modern economy” (Kennedy, 1962). However, Thomas Kuhn argued that
“scientists work from models acquired through education… often without quite knowing or needing to know
what characteristics have given these models the status of community paradigms.” (Kuhn, 1962) These
paradigms, and the contexts in which they were developed, had a deep impact upon economic theory.
Keynes and Hayek were products of their environments. Keynes believed in government intervention
to do what private enterprise didn’t, not to replace entrepreneurs, when free market capitalism reigned. On
the other hand, under Mises’ tutelage, Hayek was encouraged to explore the flaws of Keynesian or “countercyclical” (saving during economic booms and to afford spending during contractions to maintain an
equilibrium) economic policy just as Keynesian thought was spreading like wildfire. Eventually, though
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Hayek did not see Keynesian logic as his mentor did, he believed it would ultimately encourage irrational
economics and socialism. Hayek’s time at NYU allowed him to study “pro-cyclical” policy (encouraging
private borrowing during booms and austerity during contractions), illustrating even interventions intended
to help private enterprise led to disequilibrium.
Faith in capitalism, as they believed it should be practiced, is what allowed these two men to remain
steadfast in the way that they defended it. Keynes was considered to be a “brilliant and original thinker” who
had the ear of the British government and an “obstinate and self-centered” financial investor that could
spend his mornings checking on the markets. Living in an individualistic society in which he was rewarded
for his work could have made him into a preacher of capitalism. Instead of shaking his faith in capitalism,
the Great Depression only solidified his desire to explain how the ideology could be practiced more
perfectly. Keynes’ views on monetary policy were motivated by his desire to prevent the economic
instability out of which people could sympathize with socialists and fascists, as they did in Germany after
World War II. Though a young Hayek had socialist leanings, his intense desire to be an academic allowed
him to be shaped by a scholar of the statue of Mises. Though he considered his study of law to be a
“sideline”, he had an awareness of the ways economic rules could be written. He personally experienced
how policy, such as printing vast sums of money, could impact wages while working for as a legal assistant
in the Austrian government after World War I. Studying the business cycle gave him what seemed to be a
clear-eyed view of the ways an economy naturally came to an equilibrium point all by itself. That
equilibrium could have been precious to a veteran who saw firsthand the destruction of political instability.
These two influential thinkers were believers in capitalism because how they understood its forces supported
the beliefs they had developed as young men and held onto in adulthood.
Mainstream economists, even “divergent” ones like Keynes and Hayek, often lack the tools to
challenge their bias and underlying assumptions, making their theories of limited usefulness. They have a
tendency to ignore how the resulting models fail to be positive due to the Western post-Enlightenment
cultural context they were living and studying. It has hard to integrate that perspectives with others, thereby
complicating the resulting theory, is tough due to the strong desire for simplicity and predictability. A
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variety of mental shortcuts, or heuristics, are created by humans to decrease their cognitive load, a large
topic of focus within behavioral economics (Kahneman, 2003). Inclusion makes a reliable model much more
extremely difficult, incentivizing those who appreciate predictability to push a worldview into it. For
example, a political economists familiar with anthropology may argue that if my community is communal,
the business owner may derive more value from investing in their cousin’s school fees than their firm’s
future profits. In a society that is individualistic, the firm’s future profits may get that investment.
Economics seems to believe that it can predict our turbulent world and its thinkers are just as
susceptible to the bias within their models as other scholars who are deemed less powerful. Economics may
become more of a historical, sociocultural or anthropological study as opposed to a mathematical or
statistical one. This makes the contributions of subfields immensely important towards sounding the alarm
for bias. Elements, regardless of their relationship with others in the community, must have their
perspectives incorporated for a messier yet more accurate model of the context in which we find ourselves.
Without it, a dominant group is susceptible to leading the community away from its full potential.
The issue of faith is one into which I would have loved to delve, however, due to resource
constraints, I could not. I implore others who are interested in political violence or preventing the
institutional changes or maintenance that could facilitate structural violence to pursue this issue. However,
conflict studies focus too much on religiosity when thinking about the role of faith in hardening position.
Seeing faith in a broader way could provide for a useful engagement with why groups choose to support
hardliners instead of adaptive leaders. Defining spirituality more inclusively could allow for an inquiry into
why we hold onto our beliefs and reject unconventional yet viable solutions to conflicts in which we are
engaged. A definition I envision is:
A normative set of constantly evolving beliefs, attitudes and behaviors which, when
practiced and reflected upon, provide the feedback a community needs to maintain
dynamic equilibria with existence. This is through a deep reverence for being a part of
something larger and seeking meaning and purpose in relation to it. It includes the
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acknowledgement of the small role the community plays in what has been, what is and
what will be and the natural forces which dictate such a role.

Neoliberalism the product of ideological conflict
The “paranoid style” becomes dangerous when a more dramatic contextual shift requires the creation
of new systems to facilitate collective solutions. Political economists in the classical school also commented
on what society should look like and provided what would become the backbone of ideologies such as
liberalism and conservatism. One example of this is John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty which sketched a vision
of what it meant to be a free and equal society. In the early to mid-1900s, the New Deal Era placed
liberalism at the center of US American Political Economy. The systems, the interface between structure
(i.e., New Deal policies) and culture, that emerged out of those legislative changes deeply influenced the
conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of the organization of collective resources in response to
past, present or future issues (Brinkley, 1995). The disagreement over those systems has remained
contentious through the right’s desire for freedom and the left’s appreciation for social interventions.
The constant state of re-regulation seems to emerge out of the desires of the side that sees themselves
as “losing” which uses that as motivation to stir their voting bloc. A participant who self-identified as an
“independent – classic liberal, libertarian, anti-globalist” believes the “other” does not reach across the aisle
because their “entire ideology stands on the assumption that people can’t be trusted to think for themselves”,
a way of thinking that comes from “statist ideology via public schools, liberal arts professors, the media, and
others”; this is how Hofstadter (1964) described the “paranoid style”. Though his writings focused on the
extreme right, the extreme left or any other political minority can also embody the “paranoid style”.
Neoliberalism as a set of policies pushed by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, supported by
Hayek and Friedman and funded by the Koch brothers assumes this group’s power is ultimate and derived
from omniscience so they are able to construct a water-tight reality for their followers. Just like the extreme
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right, the extreme left is incapable in seeing how their past actions may have influenced the rise and
maintenance of neoliberalism.
It is the waging of this conflict that has produced the ecosystem of processes that I understand as
neoliberalism. Both sides emerge with, as one participant put it, an “our team at all cost” mentality; they
seek to win instead of solve. The lack of dialogue crafts a reality within which the overarching strategy is
entrenchment, as opposed to any clear vision of the future. This loose conglomerate of policies results in the
validation of both the “over-regulation” narrative on the right and the erosion of critical policies narrative on
the left. However, even though both groups make valid claims, they lack the willingness and capacity to
engage constructively with the “other”. Neoliberalism, therefore, is the result of poor conflict transformation
between ideologies within US American Political Economy, not an integrated policy push by any actor.
Neoliberalism is the nexus of neoclassical and Keynesian economics and rigid political ideologies: it
is a Political Economic concept. Neoliberal policies work today because of the Keynesian Political Economy
of the early and mid-1900s. Without that particular philosophy towards governance, neoliberalism would not
have the systems for its implementation. Strong private property rights and equality seem to open
opportunities for the dispossessed masses to climb the socioeconomic latter. However, it often is to the gain
of the political economic elite in the way that the state is in a constant state of reorganization to let markets
be free. The result is a set of policies which promote laissez-faire attitudes towards the economy, but do it
through political intervention (Cahill and Konings, 2017).
Treating neoliberalism as a distinct economic or political entity results in ignorance of the
exploitation of labor and land or the minimization of the role of social identity narratives in interpreting
policies (Cahill and Konings, 2017). Neoliberalism survives economically because it successful as measured
by post-Enlightenment empiricism. Economics being an exclusive science prevents the challenging of
metrics like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and unemployment towards broader, deeper measurements such
as Gross National Happiness and mis- and dis-employment. Trans-, inter-, multi- and antidisciplinarian work
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has allowed for subfields to emerge within economics, challenging the importance of these hollow metrics’
“Truth” and pushing the field of economics towards more context-sensitive, holistic measurements.
Politicians’ awareness of the sociocultural undercurrents within the economy and the desire to
intervene to maintain them is a Keynesian mindset. However, both sides of the political aisle tend to only
want this intervention when it conveniences them. Neoliberalism does not survive politically through the
mis- and dis-education of a conservative political base, as liberals tended to argue in both primary and
secondary sources in this research. Instead, the way in which political leaders engage social and religious
conservatives and the business community defends the values and interests of those voters and popular
movements (Cahill and Konings, 2017; Konings, 2015). This conservative voting bloc is satisfied through
intervening when the “evil doers” try to undermine freedom (Hofstadter, 1964). Those who are not structural
minimalists are marked as liberals simply because they like “big government”. Liberals are also pacified by
this interventionist mentality when it halts the erosion of social programs promulgated under liberal-leaning
governments. Mainstream liberals rarely advocate for socialist programs that improve and expand upon
those in other industrialized, liberal democracies: “socialist” still has a long way to go until it is no longer a
dirty word.
The line that politicians and other decision makers are forced to walk narrows the potential solution
set when faced with an issue. The lack of moderate voices tempering more extreme positions and translating
across divides makes it difficult for leaders to constructively engage with stakeholders. Ideological faith of
voting blocs elevates perception of defending morality above seeking unconventionally viable alternatives.
These two interconnected issues polarize voting blocs and the “paranoid style” of US American politics
helps maintain the No Man’s Land in the middle. If these issues are addressed, neoliberalism may begin to
embody the collaboration between not only neoclassical and Keynesian economics and the dominant
political frameworks, but the quitter ways of thinking, feeling and being. These smaller, more complicated
perspectives are not simplified, institutionalized and maintained in the way they need to in order to compete
with dominant ideologies. However, these perspectives have so much to offer as mediators between the
powerful frameworks used within US American Political Economy to make sense of the world.
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Liberals’ sin
Particular scholars, such as Arthur Okun (1975), have increased their following by discussing the
relationship between equality and efficiency. Conservatives were accused of victim-blaming, lacking
compassion and acting in contradictory ways to their stated interests. However, the business community
within that political coalition is very clear on their appreciation for efficiency and willingness to prioritize it
over equality (Phillips-Fein, 2009). If liberals genuinely value freedom and equality they must begin to
consider how their community crafts its understanding of challenges and successes across time so they can
engage with conservatives. Without a mindfully compassionate perspective, advancing the interests aligned
with the liberal values of freedom and equality could prove difficult when interacting with a conservative
political bloc that values efficiency.
The struggle to embody freedom and equality became clear in how some participants brought the
class struggle into full view in their responses. Definitions of the liberal community were “willing to invest
in the welfare of those without resources” or “support economic/ political programs that aim to level the
playing field or help to create more equal opportunities for people from different socio-economic
backgrounds”. The value behind this was made clear; liberals are “community and individual-oriented” and
they believe in “sharing”. Liberals were also described by one participant as either “Broke as hell and in
need of social aid, or Elitist and Wealthy”. An individual who self-identified with a lower socioeconomic
class stated that they didn’t reach across the aisle towards conservatives “Because one wants to impoverish
me and blame me for my own victimization. I can't deal with a belief structure like that.” It seemed as if the
liberal community could be divided into those who paid for social programs they believed in and those who
received those benefits. Looking at the distribution of participants regarding socioeconomic status, the
middle and upper middle class were best represented. However, looking at the responses of those that selfidentified with lower socioeconomic classes, the middle may have aligned itself with the upper classes.
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Liberal political economists seem to have difficulty holding onto freedom and equality as values and
they struggle to advocate for allocation resources according to broader, deeper needs. In theory, scarce
goods and services are privatized and commodified in order to reduce usage or extraction, preventing what
is known as the Tragedy of the Commons.1 However, in practice, this encourages only those that associate a
high value (through their willingness to pay a high price) to buy them, making it easier for a rich person who
mildly appreciates something to acquire it than a poor person who would move heaven and earth. Fred
Hirsch (1976) defines “positional goods” as finite resources or items that denote a particular rung of the
socioeconomic hierarchy. Due to the nature of US American beliefs that anyone can climb the
socioeconomic ladder if they work hard and spend and save their earnings wisely, the existence of positional
goods and services can create a “false sense of hope of what economic growth means for the individual”
(Hirsch, 1976). Therefore, even if someone is not getting their needs met, they may hold onto the institutions
facilitating the creation of those same goods and services they don’t have access to now so that when they
are rich, they don’t constrain their ability to obtain them. The American Dream has slowly been globalized,
best shown by the growing Chinese consumer class. However, this Dream has become something that
requires an ever-rising income, pushing it away from middle and working class US Americans.
This belief maintains the truth some hold that economic growth can solve these issues all by itself,
instead of promoting more sustainable, inclusive development. Politicians and policy “experts” implore US
Americans to listen to their gospel of growth even as climate science makes it clear what particular religion
can do. Growth is not a solution to the problem, but a way to kick the can down the road. Instead of listening
to Keynes’ advice about saving for a rainy day, US Americans embrace a more laissez-faire attitude. Only
when it rains do they come back to Keynes. If we are to have sustainable growth, the United States cannot
continue this constant cycle of re- and de-regulation.

1

I do not include commentary on the Tragedy of the Commons since there are many incredibly insightful resources on this topic
into which the reader can look for more information. Scholarship on how scarcity can motivate particular development paradigms,
like privatization, could also be helpful.
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This faith in growth allows the ideas of Keynes and Hayek to continue to survive even when they do
not continue to provide solutions to modern-day questions. Furthermore, it allows decision makers to adhere
to ideology as they see fit. Keynesian interventions into the economy have occurred under conservative
governments just as Hayekian thinking has prevailed under liberal ones. It was a Democratic president that
stated ended the era of big government and a Republican president that injected trillions of dollars into the
economy after the Great Recession (Wapshott, 2011, Presidential Preservation Project, 2018). Though it
appears that periods of relative prosperity produce Hayekian thinking and periods of economic contraction
encourage intervention, there are also those who oppose this thinking. During periods of calm, there are
those that push for more intervention in the economy, such as asking for increased economic inclusion, as
witnessed during the Civil Rights, Feminist and other movements after the economic boom years following
World War II. After the financial “bailouts” in 2008, conservative political commentators referred to
Hayekian thinking (Wapshott, 2011).
Regardless if it is Keynsian or Hayekian theory, the faith in growth as a solution, in and of itself, is
unsustainable. The myth of growth may emerge from how US Americans learn about their own history.
Research shows that areas that developed to meet the needs of the industrial revolution developed a deep
sense of working class identity in England, but also still bear the scars of the structural and cultural violence
that were required in order to supply the labor capitalists required in factories (Obschonka et al, 2017). The
shiny steel and glass buildings in London do not pay tribute to the individuals that sacrificed for the
economy out of which those modern marvels emerged. Similarly, the liberal community, especially
environmentalists, have crafted a narrative of coal miners that is very different from the scholars that have
done deep research into their story as the miners and their families tell them. “Black lung” disease,
extremely low wages and other challenges do not appear within the narratives that describe the people
whose contributions fed the nation’s power grid. Instead, the miners themselves are blamed for doing the
only work that could support their families (Environmental Media Association, 2017).
The United States does not attempt to acknowledge the sacrifices working class US American made
for the economic growth of the nation. Producing for the European armies before the World Wars, and the
43

US American one after it entered the militarized conflicts, building the nation’s infrastructure before and
after the World Wars illustrated the human and mechanical power of the United States. The young nation
also experienced technological innovation allowing for the mass production steel, the telegraph, electricity,
automobiles and other products facilitated an economic boom. This period happened to be dominated by
Keynesian thinking and, maybe more importantly, feeling. Those who were in the US American middle
class enjoyed drastic increases in their standard of living. However, as other nations industrialized and
incorporated those technologies, the US American manufacturing edge evaporated and the median wage
stagnated in real dollars (Gordon, 2016).
The rise of neoclassical economics was at the end of this loss of advantage. Debt seemingly became
a way for US Americans to borrow out of tough conversations about budgets and how they facilitate the
embodiment of our values and interests. Entrenchment into the golden age of US American capitalism
became an impediment to discussing the wealth inequality that had emerged from the laissez-faire economic
policies (Stiglitz, 2013). Though research regarding “elite capture” has grappled with how this issue might
be happening, it can do better to take a more compassionately mindful position by pointing out a lack of
representativeness in US American Political Economy.
Allowing for money and wealth to be a topic of discussion could be a way to address other
entrenched conflicts. “Money” appeared 17 times in the open-ended survey questions, highlighting a major
topic for not only disagreement between liberals and conservatives, but in the liberal “camp” as well. This is
where Thomas Picketty, Joseph Stiglitz and other economists have made names for themselves. The
discussion of inequality seems to be an undertone of comments in the survey. This mirrors how jobs,
unemployment and other terms connected to livelihoods dominate US American Political Economic
discourse. One study argues that many US Americans are “financial fragile” since 47% of US Americans are
not able to meet a $400 emergency without borrowing or selling something (PBS NewsHour, 2016). A
narrative surrounding the lack of financial, political and economic resilience could provide the required
avenues for dialogue across deeply drawn battle lines.
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A revolution towards redefinition
I encourage Political Economists to start a revolution of purpose: the field must go back to its valueladen roots. I do not mean to advance a revolution to push back against the mainstream to craft a new one. I
intend to advance a revolution of process and intention. Political economists must begin to ask fundamental
questions regarding the purpose of their field which deepens and broadens its usefulness to society at large.
Simon Kuznets was asked by the US Congress to craft what would eventually become Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP), to measure the nation’s income. Though it would be
seen as the ultimate measure of welfare, Kuznets did not see it that way. “Distinctions must be kept in
mind,” he said, “between quantity and quality of growth… objectives should be explicit: goals for ‘more’
growth should specify more growth of what and for what” (Kuznet, 1962). This is a call for these individuals
to truly pursue a more perfect understanding of economics and politics.
I am not requiring all political economists to come down from their theory and ivory towers and
walk among those who actually practice. Though some political economists are built to be practitioners, it
would be unfair to demand them all to be. I am asking those of them who wish to stay in academia to walk
the halls of their institutions to learn from those who can aid in their pursuits. Donella Meadows, a systems
thinker, seemed to have been one of the few that appreciated Kuznets’ worries, stating that we must ask
“growth of what, and why, and for whom, and who pays the cost, and how long can it last and what’s the
cost to the planet, and how much is enough” (Meadows, 1999). Not taking the time to do this results in
people that, particularly in its urban areas, “spend money we don’t have on things we don’t need to make
impressions that won’t last on people we don’t care about.” (Jackson, 2010) Instead of embracing its tenants,
political economists must see these people as allies in their pursuit to better serve a larger swath of the
communities to which they belong.
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Conclusion
My favorite quote I saw during the on-campus phase was from Jerome Bruner in Acts of Meaning: “I
take open-mindedness to be a willingness to construe knowledge and values from multiple perspectives
without loss of commitment to one’s own values. Open-mindedness is the keystone of what we call a
democratic culture.” This research, and my efforts to integrate my educations together, was inspired by one
key question: how can conflict transformation help make open-mindedness more possible within US
American Political Economy? I argue that open-mindedness requires expanded views of what is possible,
making it time for us to think about Keynes dreams in more equal proportion to his theories. After all, the
United States of America was only a dream. It had to be nurtured and defended by its dreamers. Its founding
ideals, such as all men are created equal, are still dreams we pursue, even if they may forever remain out of
reach.
Keynes said the purpose of economics was to promote a reality in which individuals could focus on
the emotional and spiritual needs, rather than the physiological ones. Keynes essentially argued that
economics was a tool to help solve how a society can ensure its citizens can meet their physiological. Then,
as this issue began to resolve itself, economics would start evolving to focus on addressing “higher” needs,
such as belonging, esteem and self-actualization (Keynes, 1930). His dreams were not out of touch with
reality since research has shown that increasing incomes beyond $80,000 does little to improve our
emotional well-being (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). Western mainstream Political Economics’ goals and
tools lag behind the needs of the present and the future. Ensuring meeting physiological needs may be
achieved in the future through universal basic income, price stabilization and other policies that have yet to
be developed by scholars and practitioners in US American Political Economy.
Few people aren’t worried about the state of politics in the United States. Though the Revolutionary
and Civil Wars may be the most notable periods of polarization, present-day US American political
discourse has seen notable outbursts of political violence. The space from which ideas about how the nation
allocates its resources in alignment with its collective values and interests is, itself, mired with destructive
violence. However, it remains the space in which citizens articulate, conceptualize, implement and alter the
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social reality within which they aspire to live. This subset of our lives houses our hopes and fears and the
social dynamics that connect them into nested webs, building out of collective dreams of the society we
aspire to call home. The Democratic and Republican Parties are struggling to produce unconventionally
viable solutions to advance the values and interests of the US American liberal community. The Parties must
begin to facilitate conflict transformation among members and between citizens not only to ensure their
survival, but also that of the values and interests they represent.
The ways forward for communities to craft an inclusive, holistic economic model through conflict
transformation are about changing this posture. The divide between those that see an inclusive, holistic and
embedded political economy as the way to meet the needs of the majority and those who embrace positive,
universal neoliberalism is wide. However, it is tightly-held perceptions that maintain this chasm and
unconventionally viable solutions can still emerge so long as constructive engagement exists. They must
begin to practice conflict transformation as a way to heal overused muscles and strengthen underused ones
so liberals can endure the tests of constructive engagement. It is this process that will develop the tools,
allowing them to highlight complexity within narratives and common ground between groups.
I believe this requires community members to stop consuming a diet of information which almost
exclusively supports their own worldviews through the channels with which they are most familiar. This
also requires institutions to maintain systems of culturally-relevant rituals to check the bias of the
community they support. Without citizens being able to get and then stay longer outside of comfort zones,
the common ground from which to craft inclusive, holistic and culturally-sensitive allocations of resources
will be less visible, making it more frustrating to reach.
If liberals are going to continue to advance freedom and equality, the political economy they theorize
and practice must advance a more integrated existence through nurturing other modalities of knowing back
to health so that they may advance other truths. Ideology, therefore, becomes the interface between what a
community believes and what it does. Ideology becomes a process that facilitates evolution and adaption to
promote both progress and predictability. Progress to evolve in alignment with a changing context and
adaptation of our attitudes to remain at peace within the context as it shifts.
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Due to the emotional tie to our ideology, a shifting context often encourages groups to entrench and
deny the causes of issues that arise from failing to adapt. This inability to make the leap of faith into a new
yet deeply continuous sense of self narrows the set of solutions that shift a community and its resources
towards healing from the past and preparing for the future. To counter this, liberals and conservatives must
engage in adaptive leadership in order to prepare themselves for the approaching future. This shift in
leadership paradigm could increase inclusion, providing a more holistic, complex manner in how shared
cultures and structures and, ultimately the shared past, are remembered. Identifying as complex
conglomerates could facilitate less drastic and more frequent bottom-up and middle-out changes to culture,
structures and the collective storage of the past.

Appendix
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Ethnicity

Frequency

Biracial

1

Black and White

3

Asian and White

1

Latina and Asian

1

Education

Frequency

Medical School

1

51

52

Other Places

Frequency

Island

1

College Town

1

53

54

Political Distribution
very conservative
conservative
independent
liberal
very liberal
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Faith Dedication
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

"100" represents highest dedication

Faith Dedication
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5

1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
33
37
41
45
49
53
57
61
65
69
73
77
81
85
89
93
97

0

"100" represents highest dedication
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Socioeconomic Class
12
10
8
6
4
2

1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
33
37
41
45
49
53
57
61
65
69
73
77
81
85
89
93
97

0

Class Distribution
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

"100" represents highest class

The following word clouds are from all of the open-ended questions (questions 11 through 16). The ranking
of words was crafted with SurveyMonkey’s algorithm. Due to how closely frequency and ranking seemed to
line up, the affect upon the importance of words within the word clouds was assumed to not be sufficient for
omitting them. The table contains words that were used often among all open-ended responses:
Key Words

Frequency

Government

32

Social, Community or Safety Net

32

Believe or Belief

14

Money

17

Taxes or Low Taxes

12

56
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